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Abstract 
 
With the help of a stylized economy resembling the features of a developing country endowed 
with huge supply of unskilled labor, informality, informality related corruption and limited 
supply of educational capital we examine how virtual trade with a country located in a 
geographically different time zone affects the factor prices and subsequently output of different 
sectors. We show that skilled labors and educational capital owners are the beneficiaries of 
virtual trade. The service sector expands and the formal and informal good producing sectors 
contract along with the number of people engaged in corruption related intermediation. 
Following this, we also check the effect of a fall in the extent of cost of corruption. Results show 
an increase in unskilled wage and outflow of educational capital thus hurting the skill intensive 
sector. We proceed further to club the effects of both virtual trade and fall in cost of corruption 
and explore the consequences. Interestingly, both skilled and unskilled labors benefit. The effect 
on output and intermediators, however, is ambiguous.  
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1. Introduction 
Most of the activities of today’s globalized world are connected via internet. Be it 
merchandise trade or service trade it has been playing a significant role. And in case of 
service trade the role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is predominant. 
Services that were considered to be non-tradable a few decades ago are now being traded 
breaking the limitation for the provider and the consumer to be present at the same place. 
Examples of such services can be financial services, insurance services, legal advices, 
accounting, advertising, management consulting, company’s front desk works, services 
related to communication, computer, software programming etc. According to the World 
Bank value of ICT service exports in the world as in 2016 was about 1.4 trillion US dollars; 
percentage of communications, computer, information, and other services was 45.9% and that 
of insurance and financial services was 11.7% of the total service exports in the world.  In 
this paper, we term the trading of information through internet or availing commercial or 
business service from professionals using ICT as virtual trade. Besides, availability of ICT 
has also allowed producers of services to outsource1(insource) service creation activities to 
(from) that part of the world that can produce it in an efficient and economical manner. In this 
case of creation of services using communication technology, time zone difference between 
the partner countries can be most beneficial for the producers. For instance, suppose a 
software programming firm in USA opens a branch in India. Since both the countries are 
located in different time zones the regular working time of the two locations do not coincide. 
This difference in working hours turns out to be very useful. When working hours end in 
USA the semi-finished task is transferred through the internet to India where the working 
hours have just started. Indian engineers start working on them and send it back when their 
working hours end. In this fashion, the task can continue for 24 hours and the work gets 
                                                 
1The terms outsourcing, fragmenting and offshoring though have technically different meanings, in this paper 
we use it synonymously indicating the separation of a production process to affiliates in different locations on 
the globe.  
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completed earlier compared to the time required when production takes place only in one 
location or in a single time zone.  
 There is no doubt that technology is changing every day and so are consumers’ choices. 
It may happen that when a particular product is conceived it is in high demand but if its 
production is delayed, the rapid technological progress may make the consumers’ demand to 
shift to a more advanced product causing severe loss to the producers. Therefore, time plays a 
very important role in production these days and virtual trade across different time zones 
allows production to get accomplished quickly. Some theoretical papers that discuss the role 
of time zones in production and trade are Marjit (2007), Kikuchi and Iwasa (2010), Kikuchi 
and Marjit (2011), Mandal (2015), Mandal et al. (2018b), Marjit and Mandal (2017), Kikuchi 
(2006).2 Other notable papers that add insights to the role of time zones on service trade and 
the consequent effect on the involved economies and economic agents are Matsuoka and 
Fukushima (2010), Kikuchi and Marjit (2010), Kikuchi and Long (2011), Kikuchi et al. 
(2013), Nakanishi and Long (2015), Head et al. (2009), Dettmer (2014), etc.  
 Along with a well-developed ICT, another important requirement for such trade is 
that the labors of the partner country must be skilled enough to work on the outsourced semi-
finished task. For skill formation, educational capital is a must. So, the current essay deals 
with the inflow and outflow of educational capital, brought about by virtual trade or some 
other parametric changes, in an economy where both formal and informal sectors exist. 
Presence of formal and informal sectors in an economy is a well-known fact and is true for 
almost every economy. According to ILO (2018) the non agricultural informal employment 
in developing and emerging economies together accounts for 59.5% of the total employment 
and for the developed countries it is about 17.1%. Globally the level of informal employment 
is 50.5% of the total non-agricultural employment. Including agriculture, the figure rises to 
                                                 
2
 A brief review of all the theoretical works done on the idea of time zones and trade can be found in Prasad et 
al. (2017) 
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61.2 % of the total employment. Following conventional arguments (Marjit and Kar, 2011), 
in our paper we reason the cause of informality to be the incapability of the formal sector to 
absorb the huge labor supply available within the economy.  Precisely, by informal units we 
refer to those who were not lucky enough to secure a job in the formal sector and have to 
survive by doing income generating productive activities which do not necessarily follow 
government prescribed rules and regulation, for example, they escape tax, they are not 
registered, their employment is not formally contracted, etc. Disobedience towards the rules 
makes them devoid of enjoying social and legal protection, wage regulations and property 
rights. We differentiate between formal and informal sector by difference in the wage of 
unskilled labor. In the formal sector, there is job security and presence of labor unions who 
can bargain for a standard wage rate and demand the implementation of minimum wage laws. 
The informal workers, however, do not have this opportunity; they have to compete in the 
market and get the competitive wage. The informal units’ operations are highly labor 
intensive and requires little amount of capital.  
 One more aspect of mostly developing economies is the presence of extortion related 
corruption. Extortion activities may exist in both formal and informal sectors. Extortion here 
refers to forceful or involuntary payment of money to a group of people in order to avoid 
damage that could be caused by them (Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998; Battisti et al., 2015) or 
to lubricate official processes (Mishra and Ray, 2010; Choi and Thum, 2005) or to get 
protection against violation of government regulations (Mandal et al., 2018a).  Papers like 
Piculescu and Hibbs (2005), Choi and Thum (2005), Johnson et al. (1999) and Friedman et 
al. (2000) claim that corruption in the formal sector give rise to informal activities. We have 
slightly different viewpoint, in our model, informality gives rise to corruption and it is present 
only in informal sectors. Again, the extortion activity in our paper is in some way related to 
what Bhagwati (1982) christened as Directly Unproductive Profit (DUP) seeking units who 
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are not actively involved in the production but tries to gain profit taking advantage of the 
informal nature of productive units. The informal units fall prey to this type of corruption as 
they do not fully abide by government prescribed laws and thus cannot avail legal protection. 
They pay the extortionist in order to get saved from punishment because of their extralegal 
nature. In case of legal troubles, the people engaged in extortion claim to negotiate with the 
officials and save the informal segment from being penalized. Therefore, presence of 
informal sector gives rise to a corrupt segment in the economy that does not take part in 
productive activities but helps the informal sector to subsist by doing intermediation 
activities.  
 On the other hand, presence of educational capital also connects formal and informal 
productive segments as it helps the workers in the informal segment to get skilled and secure 
a job in the formal sector, thus moving to a legally and socially acceptable segment free from 
extortionists’ harassments3. The current research encompasses all the above mentioned issues 
and tries to observe the effect on factor prices and output when a) the service sector opts for 
virtual trade across different time zones; b) the extent of extortion fee falls; and c) when both 
‘a)’ and ‘b)’ occurs together. The paper is related to Mandal et al. (2018a), Mandal et al. 
(2018b) and Mandal and Roy (2018) but incorporation of the ideas of virtual trade owing to 
time zone difference, inflow/outflow of educational capital, and corrupt informal sector 
together makes this paper different from the existing lot. 
 Remaining paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of the 
model. There are formal and informal sectors with the informal sector being subject to 
extortion. There are four factors: skilled labor, unskilled labor, physical capital and 
educational capital. Unskilled labor who could not secure a job in the formal segment has two 
options, to get involved either in productive informal activities or in directly unproductive 
                                                 
3
 We assume there is no corruption in the formal sectors as in case of such encounters the formal units can 
rightfully claim protection against the extortionists. 
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extortion activities. Skill formation is one way to reduce the size of informal and corrupt 
units. Section 3 elucidates how virtual trade instigates inflow of educational capital favoring 
skill formation. Consequently, there are changes in the factor markets, factor prices and 
output. Another option where the corrupt activities can be discouraged is the fall in the fee 
that is to be paid to the intermediators. Section 4 describes the resultant condition of the 
economy in response to a fall in the fee that the informal units pay to the extortionist. Results 
reveal an expansion of the informal sector while the effect on intermediators is conditional. 
However, skill formation is discouraged under such change. Section 5 tries to combine both 
the effect of virtual trade across different time zones and a fall in extortionists’ fees. Both 
skilled and unskilled labors gain under such change. Size of different sectors depends on 
inflow or outflow of educational capital, which again depends on the magnitude of the two 
counteracting changes. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model  
We consider a small open economy facing competitive goods and factor markets. The goods’ 
market open in every 24 hours. 12 hours of daytime is dedicated to work and the nighttime is 
the leisure time (see Marjit, 2007 for further details). There are four factors of production – 
skilled labor (𝑆), unskilled labor (𝐿), physical capital (𝐾) and educational capital (𝐸), with the 
economy being abundant in 𝐿.4 There are two formal sectors 𝑋 and 𝑌. 𝑋 is a service whereas 𝑌 is a physical good. The production of service requires 𝑆 and 𝐾. 𝑌 is produced using 𝐿 and 𝐾. 𝐸 is required to upgrade 𝐿 into 𝑆. 𝑋 is 𝑆 intensive and 𝑌 is 𝐾 intensive. Some portion of 𝐿 
cannot be absorbed in the formal sectors so they earn a living producing informally. We term 
                                                 
4
 The symbols that has been used in this paper are: 𝑆= total endowment of skilled labor; 𝑆𝑖= initial endowment 
of skilled labor; 𝑆′= newly trained skilled labor; 𝐾= physical capital; 𝐿= total endowment of unskilled labor; 𝑋= 
service output; 𝑌= formal sector good production; 𝑍= informal sector; 𝑁= extortionists or the corrupt sector; 𝐿𝑁= 𝐿 engaged in 𝑁; 𝐿𝑆= 𝐿 that upgrades to 𝑆;𝐿𝑃= 𝐿 engaged in productive sector 𝑌 & 𝑍; 𝐸= educational 
capital;𝑤𝑆= wage of skilled labor; 𝑤 = unionized wage: 𝑤=wage of unskilled labor ; 𝑅= rent of educational 
capital ; 𝑟= rent for 𝐾; 𝑃𝑋= price of 𝑋; 𝑃𝑌= price of 𝑌; 𝑃𝑍= price of 𝑍; 𝛿 = the discount factor; 𝛼 = extortionists’ 
share in price of 𝑍; 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = amount of factor i used in production of one unit of j (i=S, K, E, 𝐿; j=X, Y, S, Z); 𝜃𝑖𝑗 = 
distributive share of 𝑖 in 𝑗; 𝜆𝑖𝑗 = employment share of 𝑖 in 𝑗. 
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this sector as the informal sector (𝑍) which is unskilled labor intensive. With the rise of 
informal productive activities, there arise some corrupt people who are also engaged in the 
informal sector. However, they are unproductive. We term these people as extortionist (𝑁).  
 Production of 𝑋 is divided into two sequential stages; each stage takes one working 
day and one unit of skilled labor and capital. Therefore, the production takes two working 
days and requires two units of skilled labor and capital that cannot be substituted with each 
other. The service becomes available to the consumers the third day. The price that the 
service provider receives is 𝛿𝑃𝑋 . 𝛿 is the term which discounts the price when there is delay 
in delivering the good. Since a consumer has to wait for two days to receive the product, 𝛿 
reflects the waiting cost, i.e. the cost of making the consumers wait for the product, which the 
producers bear by discounting their price. Its value ranges from 0 to 1(0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1). When 
production is delayed, 𝛿 is less than one and when the consumers receive the product on time 
its value becomes 1 (Mandal, 2015). This implies that as the time to deliver the service 
declines, 𝛿 rises gradually and ultimately attains the value 1. When 𝛿 is 1 the effective price 
becomes 𝑃𝑋 , the actual value of the product. This is in line with Marjit (2007). The cost-  
price equation for 𝑋 is given as: 
 𝑎𝑆𝑋𝑤𝑆 + 𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑟 = 𝛿𝑃𝑋  ⇒ 2𝑤𝑆 + 2𝑟 = 𝛿𝑃𝑋  (1) 
 
Per unit of 𝑌 is produced using 𝑎𝐿𝑌 amount of unskilled labor (𝐿) and 𝑎𝐾𝑌  units of physical 
capital (𝐾). The blend of inputs is chosen to minimize cost given the prevailing factor prices. 
The production takes only one working day. 𝑌 is a formal sector so following Marjit and Kar 
(2011), wage of unskilled labor is set by a bargaining process between the employers and 
labor unions. The employers have to abide by the minimum wage laws and therefore, the 
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wage is fixed at a level higher than what would be in the competitive condition. We denote 
the unionized wage as 𝑤 . The equilibrium condition for 𝑌 is: 
 𝑎𝐿𝑌𝑤 + 𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑟 = 𝑃𝑌 (2) 
 
where 𝑟 denotes the rent given to 𝐾 and 𝑃𝑌 is the price of 𝑌. 𝑌 has limited number of 
vacancies so it cannot absorb all the available 𝐿. However, unskilled labor has to survive by 
doing some income generating activities. As they could not be the part of formal segment of 
the economy they rush to the informal segment, 𝑍. As mentioned in the previous section, 
workers of this sector are not protected by labor unions so wages are determined under 
competitive conditions. Production of one unit of 𝑍 requires 𝑎𝐿𝑍  units of 𝐿 and 𝑎𝐾𝑍  units of 𝐾. The profit maximizing condition is: 
 𝑎𝐿𝑍𝑤 + 𝑎𝐾𝑍𝑟 = 𝑃𝑍(1 − 𝛼)  (3) 
 
The economy also consists of some 𝐿 that do not take part in the productive informal 
activities rather make profit by taking advantage of the extra-legal nature of 𝑍. These are 
directly unproductive units in terms of Bhagwati (1982). Because of illegal nature, the 
informal units are not certain about their survival and are likely to get evicted or caught in 
some legal issues. Therefore, 𝑍 has to rely on some form of intermediation activities what we 
call here the corrupt sector 𝑁. For this purpose 𝑍 pays a part of its income to 𝑁. The case can 
also be that these are the people who will report about the illegal activities of the informal 
units if they are not paid. Therefore, the payments that 𝑁 gets are actually through extortion. 
The term 𝛼 in equation (3) is the proportion of price of 𝑍 that needs to be paid to the 
extortionists. As competitive conditions are assumed, total payment done by 𝑍 must be equal 
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to the total cost of intermediation. If the amount of unskilled labor engaged in 𝑁 is expressed 
as 𝐿𝑁; the cost-value equation is given as: 
 𝑤𝐿𝑁 =  𝛼𝑃𝑍𝑍  (4) 
 
where the RHS is the total payment done by Z for intermediation.  
We must note here that 𝑤 < 𝑤 < 𝑤𝑆 . Therefore, 𝐿 would be willing to get trained and 
get qualified as 𝑆 in order to get a higher remuneration. This requires 𝐸, and the economy has 
some supply of educational capital (𝐸). Per unit cost of 𝐸 is 𝑅. 𝑎𝐸𝑆  is assumed to be the fixed 
amount of 𝐸 required to upgrade 𝐿 to 𝑆. Thus, if an unskilled labor (𝐿) wants to get skilled it 
has to incur the cost of educational capital (𝑎𝐸𝑆𝑅) by themselves. Also, as 𝐿 decides to get 
trained it has to forgo the wage that it was earning. So the cost of getting transformed to 𝑆 
includes the opportunity cost of training in addition to the cost of 𝐸. It will be viable for 𝐿 to 
get trained only if the cost is less or at least equal to the compensation that they will get after 
training i.e. 𝑤𝑆. Following competitive condition, we have the equilibrium condition for 𝑆 as: 
 𝑎𝐸𝑆𝑅 + 𝑤 = 𝑤𝑆 (5) 
 
It follows from the above equation that 𝐿 engaged in 𝑌 will not opt for training as 𝑤 > 𝑤 and 
the cost–price equality thus expressed will not hold. 
Therefore, we have three categories of 𝐿: 𝐿 engaged in productive sectors 𝑌 and 𝑍 (𝐿𝑃), 𝐿 
engaged in directly unproductive activities of 𝑁 (𝐿𝑁) and 𝐿 who opt for training (𝐿𝑆); i.e. 
 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑃 + 𝐿𝑁 + 𝐿𝑆 (6) 
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We assume all the factors are fully employed within different sectors of the economy. 
The full employment condition of skilled labor, physical capital, unskilled labor and 
educational capital is respectively as follows: 
 2𝑋 = 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑆′ = 𝑆 (7) 
 
 2𝑋 + 𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐾𝑍𝑍 = 𝐾 (8) 
 
 𝑎𝐿𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐿𝑍𝑍 + 𝐿𝑁 = 𝐿𝑃 + 𝐿𝑁 (9) 
 
 𝑎𝐸𝑆𝑆′ = 𝐸 (10) 
 
In equation (7), 𝑆 is the total supply of skilled labor, 𝑆𝐼 is the initial endowment of skilled 
labor and 𝑆′ represents the newly trained 𝐿 which is equal to 𝐿𝑆 i.e. 
 𝐿𝑆 = 𝑆′ (11) 
 
With this, the structure of the model is complete. We have nine variables – 𝑤𝑆,𝑤, 𝑅, 𝑟, 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍, 𝐿𝑁  and 𝑆′. 𝑟 is obtained using (2). Putting the value of 𝑟 in (1) and (3), we 
respectively get the values of 𝑤𝑆 and 𝑤. With the values thus obtained, 𝑅 can be calculated 
using (5). With solved factor prices, all technological coefficients are determined through 
constant returns to scale assumption. Now, given the supply of 𝐸, 𝑆′ is determined using (10). 
The value of 𝑆′ is used in (7) to calculate the value of 𝑋. Using the obtained 𝑋 and 
substituting the value of 𝐿𝑁  with the help of equation (4), 𝑌 and 𝑍 can be solved from (8) and 
(9). Therefore, the model is solvable.  
3. Effect of Utilization of Time Zone Difference 
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Suppose considering the sound development of ICT producers of 𝑋 decide to fragment the 
production process between two countries with each country producing one stage. As 
production cannot be continued during the nighttime, the producers decide to outsource one 
of the stages of production to a country located in a different time zone whose working hours 
starts at the end of Home country’s 12-hour workday. Thus by choosing outsourcing 
locations belonging to different time zones, the nighttime is also utilized. Let us consider that 
the two countries are identical except that their time zones are opposite. With this, the service 
production takes two working days as before but those two working days are now 
accommodated within 24 hours. As a result, the desired service is available one day earlier 
and the producers get the full value for their service. This means 𝛿 becomes equal to 1 in 
equation (1). As RHS of equation (1) has changed, to maintain the equality the LHS will also 
have to change. Given the interlinked nature of the economy, other sectors will also 
experience some changes. Rise in RHS of (1) implies the producers now fetch a higher value 
for their service. This encourages them to expand their output. Consequently demand for 
skilled labor (𝑆) and capital (𝐾) rises. Higher demand of 𝑆 raises their wage but following 
equation (2), the parameters on which 𝑟 depends remains unchanged causing 𝑟 to stick to its 
initial value. Since there is no change in 𝑟, equation (3) reveals that there would not be any 
change in 𝑤 either. Now, moving to equation (5), rise in 𝑤𝑆, therefore, leads to a rise in 𝑅. 
This implies that rise in demand for 𝑆 also raises the demand for 𝐸, an essential input for 𝑆 
formation. Higher demand of 𝐸 within the country makes 𝑅 relatively higher than 
international 𝑅. As a result, there is inflow of educational capital from abroad. Availability of 𝐸 makes way for unskilled labor to get trained and secure a job in 𝑋. This squeezes out 
unskilled labor from other sectors thus affecting their outputs. Following equation (5), it can 
be presumed that unskilled labors will come out of 𝑍 and 𝑁 leading to a contraction of the 
two sectors. 𝑌 may also be expected to fall. Since 𝑋 uses same amount of  skilled labor (𝑆) 
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and physical capital (𝐾), and 𝑍 being unskilled labor (𝐿) intensive, the amount of 𝐾 released 
from 𝑍 will be less than that of 𝐿. Therefore, there will be a high demand for 𝐾 in the 
economy. This indicates that there will be a short-term rise in its rent (𝑟) leading to a fall in 𝑌 
releasing 𝐾 and also 𝐿. It can also be noticed from the endowment equation (8) that if a fall in 𝑍 doesn’t compensate the demand of 𝐾 then there will also be a reduction in 𝑌. The 
following sub-sections illustrate the mathematical analysis and results. 
3.1 Change in factor prices 
Differentiating equations (1), (2), (3) and (5), and expressing relative change by ‘^’ notation 
we have respectively: 
 𝜃𝑆𝑋𝑤 𝑆 + 𝜃𝐾𝑋𝑟 = 𝛿 𝛿  
 
 𝜃𝐾𝑌𝑟 = 0  
 
 𝜃𝐿𝑍𝑤 + 𝜃𝐾𝑍𝑟 = 0  
 
 𝜃𝐸𝑆𝑅  + 𝜃𝐿𝑆𝑤 = 𝑤 𝑆  
 
where, 𝜃𝑖𝑗  is the value share of 𝑖𝑡ℎ  factor in the price of 𝑗𝑡ℎ  commodity (𝑖 = 𝑆, 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐸; 𝑗 =𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍, 𝑆). Following Cramer’s rule, we get the required values of relative change: 
 𝑤 𝑆 = 1𝜃𝑆𝑋 𝛿𝛿  > 0  
 
 𝑟  = 0  
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 𝑤 = 0  
 
 𝑅  = 1𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝑆𝑋 𝛿𝛿  > 0  
 
Since 𝛿   is positive, change in 𝑤𝑆 and 𝑅 both are positive. Thus, we make the following 
proposition 
Proposition I: Utilization of time zones for production of a service raises the income 
of skilled labor and the returns to educational capital while the income of other factors 
remains unchanged.         ∎ 
 
3.2 Effect on output 
Following the previous sub-section, rise in 𝑅 raises the supply of 𝐸 in the country. From 
equation (10), as 𝑎𝐸𝑆  is constant there is a rise in 𝑆′ which will cause some changes in 
equations (9) and (7). Equation (7) shows that a rise in 𝑆′ will lead to a rise in 𝑋. Equation (8) 
and (9) can show the subsequent effects on 𝑌 and 𝑍. 
To know relative change in outputs of different sector we need the following equations of 
relative change derived respectively from (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) 
 
 𝐿 𝑁 = 𝑍   (12) 
 
 𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿 𝑃 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝐿 𝑁 + 𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐿 𝑆 = 0 (13) 
 
 𝑋  − 𝜆𝑆′𝑆𝑆′ = 0 (14) 
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 𝜆𝐾𝑋𝑋  + 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝑌  + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑍  = 0 (15) 
 
 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝑌  + 𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑍  + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝐿 𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿 𝑃 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝐿 𝑁 = 0 (16) 
 
 𝑆′ = 𝐸   (17) 
 
 𝐿 𝑆 = 𝑆′  (18) 
 
Here, 𝜆𝑖𝑗  is the proportion of 𝑖𝑡ℎ  factor employed in 𝑗𝑡ℎsector (𝑖 = 𝑆, 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐸; 𝑗 =𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍, 𝑆, 𝑁). Equation (17) shows the relative change in 𝑆 is equal to that of 𝐸 which by 
equation (18) is equal to the relative change in 𝐿𝑆 i.e. the number of unskilled labors who opt 
for training. Substituting equation (17) in (14) we get the relative change in 𝑋. 
 𝑋  = 𝜆𝑆′𝑆𝐸   (19) 
 
Since 𝜆𝑆′𝑆 is positive, 𝑋 also changes in the same direction as that of 𝐸 and the change is 𝜆𝑆′𝑆 
times higher. Using (19) in (15), and (12), (13), (17) and (18) in (16) we get the following 
equations 
 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑍  =  −𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′𝑆𝐸   (20) 
 
 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝑌 + (𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁)𝑍  =  −𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸   (21) 
 
Using Cramer’s rule, equations (20) and (21) gives us the change in 𝑌 and 𝑍 
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 𝑌  =  − 1 𝜆 𝐸   𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′𝑆 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑆𝜆𝐾𝑍 < 0  
 
 𝑍  = 1 𝜆 𝐸   𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝑆′𝑆 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆 < 0  
 
where  𝜆 = 𝜆𝐾𝑌(𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁) − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑌 > 0; since 𝑌 is 𝐾 intensive and 𝑍 is 𝐿 intensive. It 
turns out that both 𝑌 and 𝑍 falls due to inflow of 𝐸. The results are conditional upon the 
factor intensity assumption. The fall in 𝑍 is due to the fact that 𝐿 is leaving for training and 
the fall in 𝑌 is because of rising demand of 𝐾. On the other hand since 𝑍 is contracting 
equation (12) indicates that there should be a fall in number of people engaged in corrupt 
activities. This means 𝐿 moves out from 𝑁 to acquire necessary training and to get qualified 
as 𝑆. 
Thus, we have the following proposition; 
Proposition II: Rise in 𝛿 induced inflow of  𝐸 leads to 
a) An increase in 𝑋 
b) Decrease in 𝑌, 𝑍 and 
c) Decrease in the number of extortionist in the economy, 𝐿𝑁   ∎ 
 
 
4.  Fall in 𝜶 
 In this section, we explore how a fall in the per-unit cost of corruption or the income share of 
the extortionists affects the economy. Fall in 𝛼 will raise the returns of 𝑍 production which in 
turn raises the returns to the factors involved in it. As equation (2) suggests that 𝑟 will remain 
unchanged; therefore, from equation (3) 𝑤 will go up. Since there is no change in 𝑟, there 
15 
 
will be no change in 𝑤𝑆 (From (1)). Given this, the condition provided by (5) is violated and 𝐿 is no longer encouraged to opt for training. Consequently, there will be a fall in the demand 
of 𝐸 and hence a fall in 𝑅. Mathematical results derived using equations (1), (2), (3) and (5) 
conform to the given intuition as we see a rise in 𝑤, a fall in 𝑅 while returns to 𝑆 and 𝐾 are 
unchanged: 
 𝑤 𝑆 = 0  
 
 𝑟 = 0  
 
 𝑤 = − 1𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 > 0  
 
 𝑅  = 𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 < 0  
 
Since 𝛼  < 0, 𝑤 > 0 and 𝑅  < 0. Rise in unskilled wage with no change in skilled wage 
implies shrinking wage disparity, which is definitely a welcome result in income inequality. 
Again, following a fall in 𝑅 in the domestic market there will be an outflow of 𝐸. Therefore, 
we encounter 𝐸  < 0. Together with this as 𝑤 has become costlier, the use of 𝐿 in 𝑍 
production will fall and 𝐾 will be required more. We can examine the change in input 
coefficients with the help of the formula for elasticity of substitution between 𝐿 and 𝐾 in 𝑍, 𝜎𝑍: 𝜎𝑍 =    𝑎 𝐿𝑍 − 𝑎 𝐾𝑍𝑟 − 𝑤  𝑎 𝐿𝑍 =  𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜎𝑍𝑤  
Using the above equation along with the Envelope condition 
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𝜃𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 + 𝜃𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 = 0 
we get 
 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 = − 1𝜃𝐾𝑍 + 𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝜎𝑍𝛼 𝛼  > 0 (22) 
 
 𝑎 𝐿𝑍 = 𝜃𝐾𝑍𝜃𝐿𝑍(𝜃𝐾𝑍 + 𝜃𝐿𝑍) 𝜎𝑍𝛼 𝛼  <  0 (23) 
 
Fall in 𝛼, outflow of 𝐸 and variation of input coefficients to make the production cost 
effective entail changes in the full employment equations and subsequently the outputs of 
different sectors. Differentiating equation (6)  
 𝐿 𝑁 = 𝑍  + 𝛼 − 𝑤  (24) 
 
Following the procedure similar to the previous section, we have the percentage changes in 
output as follows: 
 𝑋 = 𝜆𝑆′𝑆𝐸 < 0 (25) 
 
 𝑆′ = 𝐸 < 0 (26) 
 
 𝑌 = 1 𝜆 [ 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 + {𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝐸 }] (27) 
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 𝑍 = 1 𝜆  −𝜆𝐾𝑌 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  + 𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 +  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  
+ 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 > 0 (28) 
 
The expressions for changes in 𝑋 and 𝑆′ are the same as in the previous section but as 𝐸  < 0, 
both 𝑋  and 𝑆′  become negative. The effect on 𝑌 is ambiguous; 𝑌 ≷ 0 if    𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  ≶   𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝐸    𝑍 is seen to expand but the positive effect depends on the factor intensity condition. Now let 
us see the effect of a fall in 𝛼 on the intermediation activity. Putting the values of 𝑍  and 𝑤  in 
(24) 
 𝐿 𝑁 =  1 𝜆   𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  
+    𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆     (29) 
 
In the above equation, the first expression separated by the square brackets is positive while 
the second is negative. Therefore, 𝐿 𝑁 ≷ 0 depends on whether  1 𝜆   𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸  − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸   + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  ≷    𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆     
The ambiguity arises due to the fact that, on the one hand, expansion of Z attracts 𝐿 towards 
its production, and on the other hand expansion of 𝑍 also raises the need of unproductive 
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intermediation activities. And since workers get identical return in these two activities they 
are indifferent to choose between the two options. 
Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition III: Fall in 𝛼 leads to  
a) Fall in wage inequality 
b) Outflow of 𝐸 
c) Contraction of service sector and skill formation 
d) Expansion of informal productive activity 
e) Expansion of Y if   𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  
<   𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝐸    
f) Contraction of  𝐿𝑁  if  1 𝜆   𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍    
<    𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍   1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆                                                                                 ∎ 
 
5. Simultaneous Change in 𝜶 and 𝜹  
In this section, we examine the effects of change in 𝛼 and 𝛿 together and find out the eventual 
effect on the economy. Therefore, we consider a situation where the service sector opts for 
virtual trade and fragments its production process to a country with opposite time zone, and 
there is a fall in the share of extortionist in the price of 𝑍. Rise in 𝛿 favors an expansion in 𝑋 
increasing the demand of skilled labor which is followed by a rise in skilled wage. Similarly, 
fall in 𝛼 makes 𝑍 production lucrative leading to an increase in demand of the intensively 
used factor—unskilled labor. As a result unskilled wage rises. Since both 𝑋 and 𝑍 utilize 𝐾, 
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there will also be a temporary rise in 𝑟 causing a fall in 𝑌. 𝑌 being capital intensive, its 
contraction will increase the supply of 𝐾 in the economy reducing 𝑟. Mathematical results 
show no change in 𝑟 implying that the initial level of 𝑟 is restored.  The change in factor 
prices is as below: 
 𝑤 𝑆 = 1𝜃𝑆𝑋 𝛿𝛿  > 0  
 
 𝑤 = − 1𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 > 0  
 
 𝑟 = 0  
 
 𝑅  = 𝛿𝛿  𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝑆𝑋 + 𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼  
 
Therefore, effect on 𝑟 is same as in previous sections and the wage of both skilled and 
unskilled labor rises. The skilled wage is seen to depend on change in 𝛿 while the unskilled 
wage depends on variation in 𝛼. The difference between the relative changes is 𝑤 𝑆 − 𝑤 = 1𝜃𝑆𝑋 𝛿𝛿  + 1𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 
If the first part of the RHS is less than the second, then there will be a fall in wage 
gap, and conversely. This gives us the following proposition: 
Proposition IV: With the exploitation of time zone difference through virtual trade 
and a reduction in extortionists’ fee  
a) Both 𝐿 and 𝑆 benefit 
b) Effect on wage disparity is ambiguous                                            ∎ 
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Coming to 𝑅 , it depends both on 𝛿   and 𝛼 , since they change in opposite directions the 
eventual effect on 𝑅 depends on whether  
 𝛿𝛿  𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝑆𝑋 ⋛  𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼  
 
Depending on the direction of 𝑅  there will be either inflow or outflow of 𝐸 and so is 
the expansion and contraction of different sectors. The expressions for 𝑋  and 𝑆  are the same 
as in previous sections. 𝑌 , 𝑍  and 𝐿 𝑁  are found to be same as shown by equations (27), (28) 
and (29) respectively. For convenience, we rewrite them below, 𝑋 = 𝜆𝑆′𝑆𝐸  
 𝑆′ = 𝐸  
 𝑌 = 1 𝜆   𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 
+  𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝐸    
 𝑍  = 1 𝜆  −𝜆𝐾𝑌 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  + 𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 +  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍  
 𝐿 𝑁 =  1 𝜆   𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  
+    𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆     
 
21 
 
Case I: If  𝛿𝛿   𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝑆𝑋  =  𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 ; then 𝑅 = 0. This implies there will be no change in 𝐸 and 
accordingly 𝑋  and 𝑆  are also zero. However, change in unskilled wage will cause the input 
coefficients to change, as shown by (22) and (23), which entails changes in 𝑌, 𝑍 and 𝐿𝑁 . The 
percentage changes are hence, 𝑌 = 1 𝜆  𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁  𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍 𝜆𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝑎 𝐾𝑍 + 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 < 0 
 𝑍  = 1 𝜆  −𝜆𝐾𝑌  𝜆𝐿𝑁  𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 > 0 
 𝐿 𝑁 =  1 𝜆  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  +    𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆     
 
The above results show that there is a fall in formal sector output 𝑌 and an expansion 
of the informal productive sector. The percentage changes are seen to be a function of 𝛼  and 
not of 𝛿 . Therefore, fall in 𝛼 encourages 𝑍 production. Fall in 𝑌 may be because of outflow 
of 𝐾 to 𝑍 or because of outflow of 𝐿. Since both the inputs are required in production, release 
of one will entail the release of the other leading to a fall in 𝑌. Effect on the intermediation 
sector, however, is ambiguous; it will shrink only if    1 𝜆  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍   <     𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆      
 
Case II: If  𝛿𝛿   𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝑆𝑋  >  𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 ; 𝑅 > 0 this indicates 𝐸 > 0. Therefore, there will be a rise 
in skill formation and an expansion of 𝑋 following (17) and (19). With a positive 𝐸 , 𝑌 is seen 
to contract [from (27)]. Referring (28), 𝑍 will contract if the given condition holds 
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 1 𝜆  −𝜆𝐾𝑌 𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝛼 − 𝑤  + 𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍 + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍  <  1 𝜆  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸    
Following this, the condition for number of extortionists to decline is   1 𝜆  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑋𝜆𝑆′ 𝑆𝐸 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑆𝐸  +   𝛼 + 𝛼 𝛼𝜃𝐿𝑍  1 − 𝜆𝐾𝑍𝜆𝐿𝑁 𝜆    >  𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑍𝑎 𝐾𝑍 − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑍𝑎 𝐿𝑍  
Compared to the effect on output when we considered the case of a rise in 𝛿 alone, the 
expressions of 𝑋  and 𝑆’  are seen to be unaffected by an additional change in 𝛼. In case of 𝑌 
the direction of change is also same though the magnitude is larger in the present case. The 
effect on 𝑍 and 𝐿𝑁  is noticed to be affected with the added change of 𝛼. A fall in 𝛼 favors the 
production of 𝑍, which clearly tries to offset the effect of rise in 𝛿 and the result depends on 
which one is larger. The combined effect of 𝛿   and 𝛼  also makes 𝐿 𝑁  uncertain. 
Case III: If  𝛿𝛿   𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝑆𝑋  <  𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 ; 𝑅 < 0. The effect on output and 𝐿𝑁  will be same as 
discussed in section 2.2. 
Therefore, expansion of skill formation activities and service output majorly depends 
on the availability of 𝐸. 𝑌 is most likely to contract whereas the effect on 𝑍 is conditional. 
The effect on 𝐿𝑁  depends on whether the positive effect of probable rise in 𝑍 dominates the 
negative effect of fall in their income. With this, we have the following proposition 
Proposition V: Inflow or outflow of educational capital and its consequent effect on
    the size of different sectors of the economy largely depends on whether  𝛿𝛿   𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝑆𝑋  ⋛  𝜃𝐿𝑆𝜃𝐸𝑆 𝜃𝐿𝑍 𝛼 𝛼 .                                                                                                          ∎ 
 
6. Conclusion 
Taking advantage of the sound development in communication technology, services are being 
made more tradable by providing it through a virtual platform. In this paper we have taken 
the production of a service to be undertaken with the help of virtual trade and remarked that it 
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will be the most beneficial if it is traded between countries whose time zones are entirely 
non-overlapping in such a way that one country’s day matches with other country’s night. 
First, we see what effect virtual trade, in order to utilize time zone differences, has on an 
economy where both formal and informal sectors are present; with the informal sector being 
subject to extortion. Results show that skilled labor enjoys a wage hike and there is also a rise 
in rent of educational capital. The service sector expands due to inflow of educational capital 
and subsequent rise in skill formation. The physical good producing formal sector that uses 
unskilled labor and capital for production shrinks. Together with this, there is also a 
contraction of the informal sector and a fall in number of extortionists. Next, we see what 
effect a fall in per unit intermediation cost has on the economy. We find there is a rise in 
unskilled wage and informal production. Rent of educational capital falls leading to its 
outflow and hence there is a reduction in skill formation and service output. The effect on the 
size of the intermediation sector and the formal good producing sector is ambiguous. Thirdly, 
we combine both the effect of utilization of time zones and a fall in extortionists’ income 
share to check the possible outcome. In this case wage of both skilled and unskilled labor 
rises. Effect on skill formation and correspondingly the sectoral composition primarily 
depends on what happens to the return to educational capital. It turns out that virtual trade 
alone is sufficient for an economy’s development towards a skilled-based one with lesser 
degree of informality and corruption. However, if the desire is to have a society with a lower 
income inequality the second or third approach can be more beneficial.   
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